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NOTE
AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT: IS THERE
ROOM FOR LOCAL REGULATION?
Noise pollution has become a serious problem for those who
reside in the vicinity of major metropolitan airports.' As one judge
has observed,
[n]oise, including aircraft sound, is no less an environmental
pollution than the smog and smoke that pollutes the air or the
debris which poisons our lakes and rivers. It is the most difficult
form of pollution to control. No one would expect that man
should continually live inside his home with all doors and win-
dows tightly shut or walk the streets or the fields with fingers in
his ears or wear acoustical ear muffs, such as those employed on
the flight line at an airport. It is regretfully concluded that the
unwanted ambient noise, including noise emission from aircraft
on the ground and in flight, will always be with us. The search is
for the zone of unacceptable annoyance and a determination of
what, if anything can be done in attenuation.2
Local efforts to curb aircraft noise have raised the perplexing
question whether the control of this type of noise pollution should
lie in the hands of local or federal authorities. 3 Although local
authorities are closest to the continuing complaints from local
residents about airport noise, and thus in a position to respond to
these complaints, they are confronted by a complex federal reg-
ulatory scheme in the field of air commerce. 4 As a result, local
action to abate aircraft noise may be precluded because of a conflict
with federal regulations or because the federal regulatory scheme
preempts the field. This Note examines the extent to which Con-
See, e.g., Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for
Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 652 (1970); Note, Jet Noise in Airport Areas: A
National Solution Required, 51 MiNN. L. REv. 1087 (1967).
' Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 469, 261 A.2d
692, 696 (1969).
a See notes 5-35 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of federal and state
relationships in an analogous field, air pollution control, see Green, State Control of Interstate
Air Pollution, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 315 (1968); Zimmerman, PoliticalBoundaries and Air
Pollution Control, 46 J. URBAN L. 173 (1969).
' The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates the use of navigable airspace
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). It is also
authorized, pursuant to section 7 of the Noise Control Act of 1972 (49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp.
III, 1973)), to prescribe rules and regulations for the control and abatement of noise. For a
discussion of the regulatory scheme, see notes 46-61 and accompanying text infra.
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gress has preempted the field of aircraft noise abatement and
considers the avenues, if any, which remain open to local au-
thorities who seek to reduce excessive aircraft noise within their
communities.
I
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO AIRCRAFT NOISE
Localities surrounding major metropolitan airports have
sought to remedy their discontent with aircraft noise in a variety of
ways. Municipalities have enacted ordinances setting forth
minimum altitudes for overhead flights, 5 precluding overhead
flights by means of prohibitive noise abatement standards, 6 or
restricting the hours of jet takeoffs and landings.7 In addition,
municipalities,8 as well as private landowners, 9 have brought suits
against both airport operators and airlines.
Each attempt at a local solution to the problem, however, faces
a potential conflict with federal regulation under the Federal
Aviation Act'0 and, more recently, under the Noise Control Act of
1972."1 For example, the village of Cedarhurst, New York, in
response to the disturbances caused by aircraft noise from flights in
and out of nearby Kennedy International Airport, enacted an
ordinance prohibiting flights over its territory at altitudes of less
than 1,000 feet.' 2 Although the village ordinance appeared to be in
harmony with federal regulations which required all flights over
populated areas to be over 1,000 feet,' 3 the federal district court,
' See American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
6 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
7 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Stagg v.
Municipal Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969).
8 See Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 16 (D. Conn. 1971);
City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Township of
Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
' For a discussion of lawsuits by private landowners, see Starbuck, Condemnation by
Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1967); Tondel,
Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 387 (1966).
10 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970); see note 4 supra.
11 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. 111, 1973); see note 4 supra.
12 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
13 Under present Civil Aeronautics Board regulations, minimum safe altitudes of flight
are defined as 1,000 feet above congested areas and 500 feet above other areas, except
where lower altitudes are necessary for takeoff and landing. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1974).
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in Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 1 4 held the ordinance
invalid. The court, specifically finding that Congress had preemp-
ted the regulation of aircraft, regardless of altitude, pointed out
that the 1,000 foot federal limit did not apply to takeoff and
landing zones. Furthermore, the court was disturbed by the possi-
bility that "if other villages and communities, adjoining the airport,
should pass similar ordinances, the airport for all practical pur-
poses would cease to function."' 5 A similar ordinance enacted
more recently by a Kentucky city, prohibiting flights below 750
feet, was also declared void because of the conflict with Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.' 6
After the Cedarhurst ordinance was struck down in 1956, a
group of New Jersey cities and townships, all in the vicinity of
Newark Airport, attempted to achieve altitude limitations by bring-
ing a lawsuit to enjoin flights over their heavily-populated residen-
tial areas at altitudes of less than 1,200 feet.17 In City of Newark v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc.,' 8 injunctive relief was denied because of
conflict with federal regulations, leaving the New Jersey cities with
no more of a solution to the noise problem than the village of
Cedarhurst.
Since it became apparent that the courts would not tolerate
local altitude restrictions which would conflict with FAA
regulations,' 9 the town of Hempstead, New York, responded to the
'4 132 F. Supp. 871, 882 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956). An
obstacle to the success of the village in this litigation was its failure to show substantial harm
resulting from the low flights. The district court judge commented that "[n]o claim is now
made by the defendants that those flights interfered with the enjoyment of the land
beneath." 132 F. Supp. at 879.
Other opinions resulting from the Cedarhurst litigation include All Am. Airways, Inc. v.
Eldred, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954); All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 106 F.
Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953).
15 132 F. Supp. at 882.
16 American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969). The
FAA regulations conflicting with the ordinance required aircraft to approach 'the airport
adjoining the city on glide paths crossing the city at elevations of less than 750 feet. For
further discussion of the FAA and its regulatory scheme, see note 4 supra and notes 46-61
infra.
1 7 City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958).
1S Id. It was the view of the court that the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" required
the Newark plaintiffs to seek the desired change in altitude regulations from the FAA, that is,
that settlement of the question should be left to the FAA because of its expertise and
nationwide jurisdiction. For a discussion of the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine, see 3 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-VE LAW 1-55 (1958). See also Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction:
Two Chips off the Same Block-A Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 75 (1974).
"9 See note 13 supra.
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noise from aircraft overflights with an amendment to its antinoise
ordinance which specifically prescribed limitations on aircraft noise
itself. The affected airlines filed a challenge to the ordinance in
federal court. In the resulting opinion, American Airlines, Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead,20 the district court acknowledged the burden
that the overflight noise had placed on the town's residents, 21 but it
nevertheless invalidated the noise ordinance, in an opinion
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.22 Al-
though in theory the ordinance only proscribed excessive noise and
did not directly conflict with federal ceiling regulations, it had the
effect of diverting flight paths around the town and thus outside of
the flight patterns established by the FAA. 23 "In a word," the
district court concluded, "the Ordinance does not forbid noise
except by forbidding flights and it is, therefore, the legal equivalent
of the invalid Cedarhurst Ordinance.1
24
Time restrictions on aircraft landings and departures have also
been employed by municipalities to abate the noise generated by
overhead flights during the hours when it is most disturbing, that
is, between, approximately eleven at night and seven in the morn-
ing. The city of Santa Monica, California, has imposed this type of
curfew on jet departures from its airport.25 Although a California
20 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1017 (1969). The addition to Hempstead's Unnecessary Noise Ordinance forbade
"anyone from operating a mechanism or device (including airplanes) which creates a noise
within the Town exceeding either of two 'limiting noise spectra.'" 272 F. Supp. at 227. The
facts showed unquestionably that while passing over parts of the town, planes taking off
from, or on landing approaches to, Kennedy Airport regularly exceeded the first limiting
noise spectrum. Id. at 228.
21 'With the arrival of jets the noise problem had become acute for Hempstead
residents, some 150,000 of whom live within three miles of Kennedy International Airport.
The district court thus described their situation:
It was as if every existing propeller craft runway had been suddenly moved out
toward the boundary of the airport. The margin of laterally insulating air that had
sheltered the neighborhood of the airport from take-off and landing noise was
radically reduced and the impact on the surrounding communities was marked and
unhappy.
Id. at 229.
The court of appeals noted the district court's findings that the town residents were thus
subjected to noise intense enough to disturb sleep, interrupt conversations, disrupt religious
services and classroom activities, drown out radio and television, and be a source of constant
discomfort to the sick and annoyance to the healthy. 398 F.2d at 370.
22 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
23 Id. at 371 n.1.
24 272 F. Supp. at 230.
25 The curfew ordinance provides:
No pure jet aircraft shall take off from the airport between the hours of 11:00
o'clock p.m. of one day and 7:00 a.m. the next day. The Airport Director or in his
absence the watch commander of the Santa Monica Police Department may ap-
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municipal court invalidated the-Santa Monica curfew ordinance on
the ground that the ordinance was an unconstitutional attempt to
regulate a field preempted by both federal and state law,26 the state
intermediate court of appeals reversed this decision, sustaining the
ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power of the
municipality, 27 and finding no federal or California enactment
which directly conflicted with the ordinance. 28
In sharp contrast to the decision of the California court
upholding the Santa Monica curfew ordinance is the 1973 decision
of the United States Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc.,2' in which a similar ordinance 30 of the city of
prove a takeoff during said hours, provided it appears to his satisfaction that an
emergency involving life or death exists and approval is ohtained before takeoff.
SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10105(a). See also Stagg v. Municipal Court, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 318, 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1969).
26 Stagg v. Municipal Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 320, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1969). R.
E. Stagg, a jet pilot, was charged with violating the ordinance. He filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition in the superior court seeking to restrain the municipal court from proceeding
with the trial, contending that the ordinance was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate a
field preempted by both federal and state law. The superior court granted the writ of
prohibition, concluding that the subject matter of the ordinance was preempted by state law.
It did not reach the question of federal preemption. Id.
27 Id. at 323, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The court found that "[tihe subject matter of the
Santa Monica ordinance clearly comes under the cities' power to 'regulate the use of the
airport.'" This power exists pursuant to a California law, which provides in pertinent part
that, in connection with the construction and maintenance of airports and similar facilities, a
local agency may:
(f) Regulate the use of the airport and facilities and other property or means of
transportation within or over the airport.
(g) Perform any duties necessary or convenient for the regulation of air traffic ....
(i) Exercise powers necessary or convenient in the promotion of aeronautics and
commerce and navigation by air.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50474 (West 1966).
28 2 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The state court noted that both the
federal government and the state of California have regulations dealing with the flight of
aircraft. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(24), 1348(a) & (c) (1970); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21403
(West 1965). The court construed the policy expressed in these statutes to be that the right
of flight generally should not be abridged. Despite this determination, however, the court
concluded that "reasonable regulations by a municipality as to time, manner and place of
takeoff from its airport are [not] precluded because they may incidentally affect, although
they do not impair, the right of flight." 2 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
A New Jersey court, in response to a suit by a group of municipalities and individuals,
imposed a similar time restriction on takeoffs and landings at the Morristown Airport. The
court determined that although it could not supersede the expertise of the FAA on matters
concerning safety, it could concern itself with the limitation of hours of operation, an area in
which safety factors do not siguificantly come into play. Township of Hanover v. Town of
Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 472, 261 A.2d 692, 697 (1969).
29 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
30 According to the Burbank ordinance,
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Burbank, California, was struck down. The plaintiffs who sought
the judgment declaring the eleven p.m. to seven a.m. curfew
ordinance invalid were the owner and operator of the
Hollywood-Burbank airport, an intrastate air carrier,31 and a trade
association representing scheduled airlines.32 The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgments below invalidating the ordinance on the
ground that Congress, by enacting the Federal Aviation Act 33 and
the Noise Control Act,34 had preempted state and local control
over aircraft noise.
3 5
II
LOCAL V. FEDERAL REGULATION: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
A. Federal Preemption36
The issue of whether the federal government has preempted
the field of aviation regulation was framed by the district court in
Burbank in terms of whether federal legislation and regulations
were intended "to fully occupy the field of control of the navigable
(a) ... It shall be unlawful for any person at the controls of pure jet aircraft to take
off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11:00 P.M. of one day and 7:00
A.M. the next day.
(b) ... It shall be unlawful for the operator of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport to
allow a pure jet aircraft to take off from said airport between 11:00 P.M. of one day
and 7:00 A.M. the next day.
(c) ... This section shall not apply to flights of an emergency nature if the City's
Police Department is contacted and the approval of the Watch Commander on duty
is obtained before take-off.
BURBANK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 20-32.1 (1970). See also Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v.
City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 916-17 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Compare SANTA MONICA, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 10105; note 25 supra.
3" The intrastate carrier, Pacific Southwest Airlines, was actually the only airline
affected by the ordinance. It operated a regularly scheduled flight departing every Sunday
night at 11:30 p.m. from the Hollywood-Burbank airport. 411 U.S. at 626.
32 The Air Transport Association of America (ATA), an intervening plaintiff, is an
unincorporated trade association, the members of which include virtually all United States
scheduled interstate carriers. 318 F. Supp. at 916.
33 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
34 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. III, 1973); see note 4 supra.
'5 The Supreme Court decided the Burbank case solely on the grounds of federal
preemption, declining to decide whether enforcement of the Burbank ordinance conflicted
with specific federal regulations or imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce. 411 U.S. at 626 & n.2.
36 For a discussion of the development of the concept of federal preemption, see
Comment, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv.
208 (1959); Note, Congressional Pre-emption by Silence of the Commerce Power, 42 VA. L. REv. 43
(1956).
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air space. ' 37 Neither the Federal Aviation Act nor the Noise
Control Act has express provisions for preemption.38
Faced with the question of congressional intent to preempt a
field, 39 the Supreme Court in Burbank looked to the tests set forth
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.40 In that case the Supreme Court
had determined that a purpose to preempt may exist (1) where the
scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supple-
ment it," or (2) where the congressional enactment touches a "field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject," or (3) where "the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.'
Relying on the Rice tests, Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority in Burbank, concluded that the regulation of aircraft noise
was preempted because of the "pervasive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation. '4 ' The Court's focus was on the extensiveness
'7 Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 922 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
38 An example of an express provision on preemption is found in the establishment of
the Federal Communications Commission, by which it can be seen that the complete and
pervasive federal regulatory scheme occupies the entire field. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). On the
other hand, neither the Federal Aviation Act, nor the Noise Control Act expressly provides
for state control as do some other statutes. See, e.g., Natural Cas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970)
(provision for state regulation of local incidents of natural gas distribution); Air Pollution
Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a(a), 1857 d(b) (1970) (state and local government regulation
encouraged); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970) (federal and state power
to regulate atomic energy precisely defined).
The Federal Aviation Act refers to state authority only in a provision preserving
previously existing statutory and common law remedies in addition to that Act's new
remedies. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970).
" Where a federal statute does not expressly describe the scope of the power accorded
to the states within the federal scheme, the Court generally will examine its legislative history
for an expression of congressional intent. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 146-50 (1963); Colorado v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963);
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 232 (1947). See also Comment, supra note 36, at 215-16.
This was the approach apparently taken by the Court in Burbank. For a discussion of the
Court's analysis of the federal act and its legislative history, see notes 63-70 and accompany-
ing text infra.
40 331 U.S. 218 (1947). The Rice Court confronted the question of preemption under
the United States Warehouse Act. Act of Aug. II, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, § 1, 39 Stat. 486, as
amended, Act of March 2, 1931, ch. 366, 46 Stat. 1463 (now 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-73 (1970)). A
warehouseman, alleging that his business was regulated by the federal act, challenged the
authority of the Illinois Commerce Commission to make regulations dealing with prices and
storage facilities and to assess penalties for violations of Illinois law, on the ground that the
authority to regulate in this manner was preempted by the act of Congress. 331 U.S. at 222.
41 331 U.S. at 230.
42 411 U.S. at 633.
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of the federal regulation of the use of navigable air space by the
FAA under the Federal Aviation Act43 and on the comprehensive-
ness of the federal control of aircraft noise abatement by the FAA
joined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)44 under the
Noise Control Act of 1972. 45
1. The Federal Statutory Scheme of Regulation
The Federal Aviation Act, the cornerstone of the federal
statutory scheme regulating the use of navigable airspace, declares
that the United States is "to possess and exercise complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace" of the nation.46 The
Act further declares the existence of "a public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace of the United States. 47
Section 1348 of the Act authorizes the FAA to regulate the use of
navigable airspace, "in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient utilization of such airspace. '48 With this provision of the
Act in mind, the Burbank Court pointed to the findings of the
district court that the imposition of curfew ordinances on a
nationwide basis would result in a bunching of flights' in the hours
preceding the curfew with the concomitant effect of increasing
congestion and noise during those hours. 49 The Supreme Court
thus agreed with the conclusions of the district court that such
results are "totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal
statutory and regulatory scheme," and "would cause a serious loss
of efficiency in the use of the navigable airspace. 50
The FAA, under section 1348(c) of the Federal Aviation Act, is
also authorized to prescribe "regulations governing the flight of
aircraft . . . for the protection of persons and property on the
ground." 51 Prior to the enactment of an explicit noise abatement
section in 1968, 52 the Administrator prescribed noise abatement
regulations pursuant to the authority conferred by section
1348(c).53 In 1968, Congress adopted section 611 of the Federal
43 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970); see note 4 supra.
44 See notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
41 42 U.S.C. § 4901 nt (Supp. III, 1973); see note 4 supra.
46 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970).
47 Id. § 1304.
48 Id. § 1348 (emphasis added).
49 411 U.S. at 627.
5o Id. at 627-28.
51 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1970).
52 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text infra.
53 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 60 (1963); 25 Fed. Reg. 1767 (1960).
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Aviation Act which authorized the Administrator to prescribe rules
and regulations for the specific control and abatement of aircraft
noise and sonic boom.54 In formulating noise abatement regula-
tions, the Administrator is obligated, under the directives of the
Act,55 to balance the need for environmental protection in the area
of noise abatement with considerations of safety, efficient use of
the airspace, available technology, economic practicality, and the
extent to which such regulations will further the overall purposes
of the Federal Aviation Act.
'4 The 1968 enactment of § 611 provided in pertinent part:
In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the public from
unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic boom, the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation,
shall prescribe and amend standards for the measurement of aircraft noise and
sonic boom and shall prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he may
find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom, including the application of such standards, rules, and regulations in the
issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of any certificate
authorized by this title.
Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, § 1, 82 Stat. 395, amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-30
(1964) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. lII, 1973)).
5 The Administrator is directed to consider the following factors as being in the public
interest:
(a) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its
development and safety and fulfill the requirements of national defense;
(b) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics;
(c) The control of the use of the navigable airspace of the United States and the
regulation of both civil and military operations in such airspace in the interest of
the safety and efficiency of both;
(d) The consolidation of research and development with respect to air navigation
facilities, as well as the installation and operation thereof;
(e) The development and operation of a common system of air traffic control and
navigation for both military and civil aircraft.
49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
Under the 1968 amendment to the Act, Congress supplemented § 1303, setting forth
the following additional steps to be taken by the Administrator in prescribing noise
abatement regulations: '
• . . the Administrator shall-
(1) consider relevant available data relating to aircraft noise and sonic boom,
including the results of research, development, testing, and evaluation activities
conducted pursuant to this chapter . . .
(2) consult with such Federal, State, and interstate agencies as he deems appro-
priate;
(3) consider whether any proposed standard, rule, or regulation is consistent with
the highest degree of safety in air commerce or air transportation in the public
interest;
(4) consider whether any proposed standard, rule, or regulation is economically
reasonable, technologically practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of
aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance, or certificate to which it will apply; and
(5) consider the extent to which such standard, rule, or regulation will contribute to
carrying out the purposes of this section.
Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, § 1, 82 Stat. 395, amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-30
(1964) (codified with minor changes at 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d) (Supp. III, 1973)).
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Pursuant to his statutory authority, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministrator has promulgated operations rules and regulations con-
trolling the flight of aircraft and the use of navigable airspace. 56 He
has also issued regulations in the field of noise abatement.
57
The Noise Control Act of 1972, approved by the President on
October 27, 1972, involves the EPA in the scheme of federal
regulation of aircraft noise. Under section 7(a) of the Act, the
Administrator of the EPA is directed, "after consultation with
appropriate Federal, State and local agencies and interested per-
sons," to conduct a nine-month study of the adequacy of FAA
noise controls and standards, the noise exposure problem around
airports, and the measures available to local governments and
airport operators to control aircraft noise.58 Section 7(b) of the Act
directs the EPA, upon completion of the study, to submit to the
FAA proposed regulations
to provide such control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom (including control and abatement through the exercise of
any of the FAA's regulatory authority over air commerce or
transportation or over aircraft or airport operations) as EPA
determines is necessary to protect the public health and
welfare.59
"n See 14 C.F.R. §§ 71.1-77.5, 91.1-97.20 (1974).
According to the district court judge in American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, these
regulations evidenced the extensiveness of federal control. In his view, "[t]he powers
granted by the Congress are not dormant but actively exercised. The regulations of the
Administrator are of formidable proportions, impressive detail and manifest sophistication."
272 F. Supp. 226, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1017 (1969).
FAA regulations to insure efficient use of the airspace, pursuant to federal law (49
U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1970)), include "flow control" procedures, which involve monitoring
aircraft in traffic situations. Such procedures enable the FAA to regulate the number of
aircraft that will be accepted in an area and restrict altitudes or routes for specified time
periods. The FAA has also promulgated high density traffic airport rules which, in
conjunction with flow control procedures, were designed to provide relief from congestion
at major airports. 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.121-.131 (1970).
11 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.8 7 (g) (1974) (regulation of flight procedures in interest of
noise abatement); id. §§ 36.I-.201 (1974) (regulation of noise in field of aircraft design
and performance). The latter regulations, adopted in 1969, prescribe noise standards which
must be met as a condition to type certification for all new subsonic turbojet-powered
aircraft.
58 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. III, 1973). Section 7(a) orders the Administrator of the
EPA to conduct a study of the
(1) adequacy of Federal Aviation Administration flight and operational noise
controls; (2) adequacy of noise emission standards on new and existing aircraft,
together with recommendations on the retrofitting and phaseout of existing air-
craft; (3) implications of identifying and achieving levels of cumulative noise
exposure around airports; and (4) additional measures available to airport
operators and local governments to control aircraft noise.
Id.
59 49 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
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Under section 611(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended by
the Noise Control Act, the FAA, after considering the recommen-
dations of the EPA and consulting with the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, may prescribe and amend regulations for the control and
abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom. 6 0 The authority bf the
Federal Aviation Administrator extends to "the application of such
standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment,
modification, suspension or revocation of any [airworthiness]
certificate." 6'
Although both the district court and the court of appeals
invalidated the Burbank curfew ordinance on the ground of
preemption before the Noise Control Act of 1972 was signed into
law, the regulatory scheme of the Noise Control Act constituted
part of the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Burbank.62
Thus, Justice Douglas declared for the Court that the "Act
reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that FAA, now in conjunc-
tion with EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting
state and local control. '63
Justice Douglas found support for this position in the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 Act. Both the Senate and House Reports
indicated that the bill was not "intended to alter in any way the
relationship between the authority of the Federal Government and
that of the State and local governments" that had existed with
respect to matters dealt with by section 611 of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 before the enactment of the new law.64 That relation-
ship, which Congress outlined in the legislative history of section
611, is one in which the federal government has preempted "the
field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight
of aircraft."65 Section 611, the Senate Report indicated, "would
merely expand the Federal Government's role in a field already
preempted. ' 66 Since this preemption was not changed, the report
60 Id. § 1431(b)(1).
"' Id. See also id. § 1431(b)(2).
62 411 U.S. at 632-33.
63 Id. at 633.
" H.R. REP. No. 842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972); S. RPP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-11 (1972).
61 S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
66 Id. The Senate Commerce Committee based its conclusion that the field was already
preempted on its interpretation of the views expressed by the federal courts which had
considered the question. The report directed particular attention to the district court's
opinion in American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, wherein the court declared that "[tihe
legislation operates in an area committed to federal care, and noise limiting rules operating
as do those of the ordinance must come from a federal source." 272 F. Supp. 226, 231
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); see notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra. But see American Airlines, Inc.
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continued, "[s]tate and local governments will remain unable to use
their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating the flight
of aircraft. 67
However, several qualifications complicate the picture of fed-
eral punder the -resent statuto- scheme and under the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in the Burbank decision. The
legislative histories of both section 611 and the 1972 Noise Control
Act demonstrate that Congress did not intend to exclude action in
the field of aircraft noise control by the state or locality where
either functions as the proprietor of an airport. The Senate Report
on the 1968 amendment, which became section 611, indicates that
that legislation does not affect the rights of a state or local agency,
as airport proprietor, to issue regulations as to permissible noise
levels which can be reached by aircraft using the airport.68 In fact,
airport proprietors can "deny the use of their airports to aircraft
v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969)
(affirming invalidation of Hempstead ordinance solely because it conflicted with existing
federal regulations, without reaching issue of preemption); notes 87-88 and accompanying
text infra.
For a discussion of cases in which courts found that the federal government had not
preempted the field of aircraft noise control, see notes 93-96 and 100-05 and accompanying
text infra.
67 Id. The entire field of air commerce, however, has not been preempted. In Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954), Braniff sought to invalidate a Nebraska ad
valorem tax on flight equipment, arguing that federal legislation had preempted the entire
field of air commerce. The Court rejected this argument, holding that any state action
consistent with the federal scheme would be valid. Id. at 597.
In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714
(1963), the Court found that the Federal Aviation Act, in particular those sections which
prohibited air carriers from subjecting any person "to any unjust discrimination" (49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (1970)) and required "[t]he promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations" (id. § 1302(c)),
did not preempt state antidiscrimination legislation which barred racial discrimination in
hiring by air carriers. The Court stated:
[W]e may assume ... that these [federal] provisions prohibit racial discrimination
against passengers and other customers and that they protect job applicants or
employees from discrimination on account of race. The Civil Aeronautics Board
and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency have indeed broad authority
over flight crews of air carriers, much of which has been exercised by regulations.
Notwithstanding this broad authority, we are satisfied that Congress in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, and its successor had no express or implied intent to bar
state legislation in this field and that the Colorado statute, at least so long as any
power the Civil Aeronautics Board may have remains "dormant and unexercised,"
will not frustrate any part of the purpose of the federal legislation.
372 U.S. at 723-24 (footnotes omitted).
Finally, the Court ruled in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 721 (1972), that federal legislation does not evidence a congressional
purpose to preempt state power to levy charges as a means to defray the costs of airport
construction and maintenance. See Note, Pay Now, Fly Later: Head Taxes-A New Phenomenon
in Airport Finance, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 759, 765-67 (1973).
68 S. REP,. No. 1353, supra note 65.
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on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
non-discriminatory."6 9 This position is reaffirmed in the Senate
Report accompanying the 1972 Noise Control Act.1 0 The Burbank
Court acknowledged this rather broad exception to the doctrine of
federal preemption and consciously declined to consider what
limits, if any, would apply to a municipality as a proprietor.7
1
Furthermore, in promulgating noise abatement regulations, the
FAA, recognizing the authority left to airport proprietors, makes
no determination that the noise levels which it prescribes "are or
should be acceptable or unacceptable for operation at, into, or out
of, any airport. 1 2
Finally, the "saving clause" 73 of the Federal Aviation Act
suggests that the federal legislation was not intended to be exclu-
sive. The Act provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter
shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies. 1 4 Justice Brennan, concurring in Head
v. New Mexico Board of Examiners, 7 5 found that the inclusion of an
identical provision in the Communications Act "plainly is inconsis-
tent with congressional displacement of the state statute unless a
finding of that meaning is unavoidable. 1 6 The Burbank Court,
however, did not consider the implications of the "saving clause."
The language of the Court implies that the majority determined a
finding of preemption to be unavoidable. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that
[t]he Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between
safety and efficiency . . . and the protection of persons on the
ground. . . . The interdependence of these factors requires a
uniform and exclusive system offederal regulation if the congressional
objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act are to be.
fulfilled."
69 Id.
70 S. REP. No. 1160, supra note 64.
71 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.14. The Court noted:
[W]e are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Burbank as
"proprietor" of the airport, but with the exercise of police power. While the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only major airport which is privately
owned, many airports are owned by one municipality yet physically located in
another .... Thus, authority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not
necessarily congruent with its police power.
Id.
72 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1973); see notes 134-38 and accompanying text infra.
73 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970); see note 38 and accompanying text supra.
74 Id
Vi 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
76 Id. at 444 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7 411 U.S. at 638-39 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court's determination of preemption
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2. The Preemption Doctrine in Aviation Case Law
The rationale of the Burbank Court in reaching its conclusion
on preemption is not a novel one when viewed in light of the
decisions of lower courts faced with attempts to control- aircraft
noise by the exercise of local police power. The principle of federal
preemption of flight path control was first adopted in Allegheny
Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 7  where the validity of a
minimum altitude ordinance was in question. Examining the con-
gressional delegation of power to prescribe flight safety rules, the
federal district court found a clear intent to preempt the regulation
and control of aircraft, regardless of altitude.7 9 The court held that
the comprehensive scheme of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
the predecessor of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, "regulated air
traffic... in the interest of safety to such an extent as to constitute
preemption in that field."80 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance on that
ground.8 '
However, twelve years later, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of
Hempstead,82 the Second Circuit passed over the preemption doc-
trine announced in Cedarhurst,83 and invalidated the Hempstead
noise abatement ordinance on the narrower ground that the ordi-
nance was in conflict with federal law. 84 Although the district court
in Hempstead had also found the town's ordinance in conflict with
federal legislation, it had gone further in holding that the ordi-
nance prohibiting noise, which effectively forbade flight by setting
a ground level decibel limit, operated in a preempted area.85 The
seems to be premised on the third category of the Rice tests, that is, that "the state policy may
produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute." Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Justice Douglas also found preemption because of
the "pervasive nature of the scheme of regulation." 411 U.S. at 633. This finding is within
the first category of Rice tests, which declares that "the scheme of federal regulation may be
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it. 331 U.S. at 230. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
78 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
'0 132 F. Supp. at 881.
81 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
82 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1017 (1969).
83 See notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
8' The court of appeals commented on the Cedarhurst case:
The opinion can be read either as a holding that the entire feld of regulation of
aircraft flight has been pre-empted by the federal government, or as a holding that
the particular ordinance involved was in conflict with the federal regulatory
scheme. . . . Whichever reading is accepted it is clear that Cedarhurst is square
precedent for holding the Hempstead ordinance invalid ....
398 F.2d at 375.
85 272 F. Supp. at 230-31.
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district court found that "the Federal regulation of air navigation
and air traffic is so complete that it leaves no room for such local
legislation as the Hempstead Ordinance.18 6  The court of ap-
peals declined to rule on this issue, choosing instead to find the
ordinance in conflict with FAA regulations. 87 It concluded that it is
"this particular noise ordinance in this particular setting which is
found to regulate flight paths and procedures; another noise
ordinance might not have that effect."88
Likewise, the California Supreme Court, in Loma Portal Civic
Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,89 although refusing to enjoin flight
operations on the particular facts of that case,90 declined to accept
the theory of federal preemption of the field of control of flight
operations.91 "It is far from clear," in the view of that court, "that
every enforcement of any state-created right or duty which affects
air transportation would conflict with the purposes of the federal
regulation . . . [in] insuring safety of operations." '92 Indeed, this
16 Id. at 233.
87 398 F.2d at 376. The court explained:
In view of the conflict between the ordinance and the federal regulation we
need not consider the questions of federal pre-emption, and undue burden on
interstate commerce. In some situations, federal legislation and regulation is
deemed so pervasive as to rule out all state and local attempts to regulate in the
areas thus "pre-empted" by the federal government.... The area of flight patterns
and procedures may be one of these; this court's opinion in the Cedarhurst case
implies that it is, where the California Supreme Court's opinion in Loma Portal
Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. [61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 542, 39 Cal. Rptr.
708 (1964)] says that it is not.
398 F.2d at 376 n.4.
Il Id. The district court had believed that the ordinance must be tested as "one of a set"
of similar ordinances enacted by all communities neighboring the airport. In'this way, the
court saw the ordinance "revealed in its inner nature as a direct regulation of aircraft flight,"
for the effect would be potentially to shut down the airport by denying the airspace required
for landings and takeoffs. When viewed in this light the Hempstead ordinance may be
found to conflict with the authority of the Administrator of the FAA to regulate for the
safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of airspace. 272 F. Supp. at 231-32; see notes
20-24 and accompanying text supra.
89 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
90 The court held that,
under the facts of this case, i.e., the operation of aircraft with federal airworthiness
certificates in federally-certificated, scheduled passenger service, in conformity with
federal safety regulations, in. a manner not creating imminent danger, and in
furtherance of the public interest in safe, regular air transportation of goods and
passengers, an injunction is not available.
Id. at 591, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
,"1 Not persuaded of the soundness of a holding of federal preemption, the court
concluded:
A holding of federal preemption would have the effect of disabling the state from
any action in the entire field . . . [U]nless Congress had in fact intended such
preclusion of state regulation and were to carry out its responsibilities, there would
result within that state a lacuna which the state would be powerless to fill.
Id.
92 Id. at 591-92, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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court, like the Second Circuit in the Hempstead case, characterized
the Cedarhurst decision, notwithstanding the broad preemption
language, as one which invalidated an ordinance which "plainly
conflicts with the federal statutes and regulations."93
Although the pre-Burbank case law reflects a controversy over
whether local attempts to deal with aircraft noise should be dealt
with on the ground of preemption or of conflict with federal law,
the results were generally the same regardless of the rationale
adopted. If a court did not adhere to the preemption doctrine, an
easily discernible conflict with FAA regulations would generally
form the basis for invalidating local legislation or preventing state
action which affected flight paths and procedures. In fact, one of
the few types of local noise abatement measures which arguably
could withstand attack on the ground of conflict is the type of time
restriction ordinance which the Burbank Court struck down on the
ground of preemption.9 4
Prior to the Burbank decision a California court had sustained
such a curfew ordinance and a New Jersey court had issued an
injunctive order requiring a jet curfew.9 5 The California court in
Stagg v. Municipal Court, 9 6 adopting the rationale of the Loma Portal
Civic Club decision,9 7 noted that "noise abatement is a federal as
well as a state aim, and when not inconsistent with safety... would
not necessarily present a conflict with federal law but might well
reinforce it."' 98 Hence, the court reasoned that reasonable regula-
tions by a municipality as to time, manner, and place of takeoff
from its airport, such as a curfew ordinance, should not be pre-
cluded because they may "incidentally affect, although they do not
impair, the right of flight."9 9 Similarly, the New Jersey court, in
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown,100 agreed that limitation
of the hours of an airport's operation does not involve the safety
factors which are the primary concern of the FAA, and hence is a
93 Id. at 593, 394 P.2d at 555, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (citing Allegheny Airlines v. Village
of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1956)); see note 84 and accompanying text supra.
94 See notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
9' See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
96 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969).
97 See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
98 2 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580 (citing Loma Portal Civic Club v.
American Airlines, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 592, 394 P.2d 548, 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714 (1964)).
99 Id The court distinguished regulations which govern the time, manner, and place of
the takeoff from those that would abridge the right of flight. Id. Regulations which would
abridge the right of flight would interfere with flight paths through the airspace above the
minimum altitudes prescribed by the FAA or the airspace needed to insure safety in the
taking off or landing of aircraft. Id.
"1 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
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variable with which the court may concern itself in devising a
remedy for an airport noise problem.'
The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of conflict in its
Burbank decision, even though the issue was raised by the parties
and litigated in the courts below. Both the district court and the
court of appeals departed from the Stagg and Hanover characteriza-
tions of time restrictions as not conflicting with federal
regulations. 0 2 The district court found that the Burbank ordi-
nance, by denying the use of navigable airspace for a period of
hours, conflicted with the federal rights and obligations of air
carriers. 0 3 The court of appeals found the Burbank ordinance in
101 Id. at 472, 261 A.2d at 697.
The court distinguished the Hanover case from those cases in which
the municipality intruded upon an area in which F.A.A. is expert, namely altitudes,
flight patterns, take-offs and landings. With safety to the aircraft, passengers and
the land-bound public below as a prime goal, this court agrees that a court's
conventional experience and decision-making power cannot and must not supplant
the exercise of administrative discretion of the expert agency created by Congress.
Where there is a clash between state and federal authority in this regard, the
supremacy of the federal is recognized. Where there is no conflict, and certainly
where there is state action consistent with the avowed second purpose of F.A.A.
suppression of noise, a state court may act.
Id. at 478, 261 A.2d at 700. The court thus found that since the federal legislation was
designed to promote safety, its purpose would not conflict with local requirements desigued
to maintain community tranquility and welfare or protect local property interests. Ild. at
478-79, 261 A.2d at 701.
In asserting this position, the Hanover court relied on Huron Portland Cement Co. V.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), which involved a somewhat analogous situation. 108 N.J.
Super. at 479, 261 A.2d at 699-700. Huron involved a Detroit ordinance which required ship
boilers, although approved and licensed by the federal government for use on navigable
waters, to comply with the ordinance, even when it required structural changes, in order to
relieve that city from air pollution. Holding that the ordinance was not preempted by
federal legislation, the Court observed:
The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and
welfare of the city's inhabitants. ... In the exercise of that power, the states and
their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime
activities, concurrently with the federal government.
362 U.S. at 442.
The Court further pointed out that the "thrust of the federal inspection laws is clearly
limited to affording protection from the perils of maritime navigation" while the "aim of the
Detroit ordinance is the elimination of air pollution to protect the health and enhance the
cleanliness of the local community." Id. at 445. Finding no overlap between the federal and
local regulations, the Court concluded that the local action was not preempted. Id.
However, the Supreme Court, in its Burbank decision, indicated that its opinion in Huron
did not offer precise guidelines for dealing with the question of preemption under the
Federal Aviation Act. 411 U.S. at 638.
102 It should be noted that the airports involved in the Stagg and Hanover opinions are
"general aviation airports," accommodating only private flights. The Hollywood-Burbank
airport, however, is used by public carriers.
103 318 F. Supp. at 927. The Civil Aeronautics Board, by issuing to scheduled airlines
"Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity" (49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970)), authorizes
such airlines to fly specific routes and obligates them to give adequate service to the cities on
their routes. Id.
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conflict with the FAA's order establishing a preferential runway at
the Hollywood-Burbank airport for departures of jet aircraft be-
tween the hours of eleven p.m. and seven a.m.10 4 A second ground
of conflict recognized by the court of appeals was that the local
ordinance prohibited the exercise of the federally guaranteed right
of transit through navigable airspace. 10 5 The court held that "[tihe
effect of the curfew was to terminate the right of flight of prospec-
tive passengers . . . ." for eight hours each day.' 0
6
B. Interference with Interstate Commerce
State and local legislation designed to regulate aircraft noise is
also subject to challenge as violative of the commerce clause.' 0 7 The
commerce clause of the Constitution vests in Congress the author-
ity to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Even in the
absence of congressional legislation, it is well-established that state
and local governments may not materially affect commerce by their
acts.' 0 8 The Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,10 9
restated the two long-settled tests for determining whether a local
regulation violates the commerce clause. The Southern Pacific Court
declared that since Gibbons v. Ogden'" was decided in 1824, it has
been the responsibility of the courts to determine whether the local
law (1) substantially impedes the free flow of interstate commerce
or (2) operates in an area where the need for national uniformity
requires that regulation be undertaken by a single authority."'
The district court in the Burbank case made its determination
of whether the curfew ordinance violated the commerce clause not
by considering the effect of the Burbank ordinance singly, but by
envisioning the adoption of flight curfews on a national level." 2
Thus considered, the ordinance could not stand, for curfews
imposed nationwide would result in a "serious loss of efficiency as
104 457 F.2d at 676.
105 Id at 676 n.12.
106 Id.
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This provision gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States."
108 See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1946); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
1 0, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In Southern Pacific, the Arizona Train Limit Law (ARiz. CODE
ANN. § 69-119 (1939)), which made it unlawful to operate within the state a passenger train
of more than fourteen cars or a freight train of more than seventy cars, was found to
obstruct interstate train operation, and thus to be invalid under the commerce clause. 325
U.S. at 781.
"10 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
"1 325 U.S. at 767-69.
112 318 F. Supp. at 927.
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to - the use of airspace."' 13 Furthermore, the transportation of
goods and passengers would be seriously interrupted, and the
exercise and performance of an airline's rights and obligations
would be impeded.' 1 4 This analysis brings the Burbank ordinance
within the first Southern Pacific test. In addition, the district court
concluded "that air commerce, by reason of its speed and volume,
requires a single authority in control if it is to be conducted at
maximum safety and efficient use of the navigable air space."'115
Hence, the second test of Southern Pacific was met.
On its face,' the city of Burbank's regulation of flight hours at
Lockheed's airport would not seem to raise the issue of a potential
burden on interstate commerce, because the curfew only affected
the flight of an intrastate carrier.11 6 However, the courts have held
that Congress has the power to regulate aircraft operated solely
within one state 17 as well as interstate aircraft activities.", This
position stems from what the courts have termed the "affectation
doctrine," that is, that Congress has the power to regulate any
activity-interstate or intrastate-which directly affects interstate
commerce. 119 This theory was espoused by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. :120
Although activities .may be intrastate in character when sepa-
rately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
113 Id.
114 Id.; see note 106 And accompanying text supra.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, -407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969), the
court made a similar observation:
Pilots operating the aircraft of Plaintiffs cannot comply with the FAA regulations
and also comply with the provisions of the ordinance of the City of Audubon Park.
. [Enforcement of the ordinance] would constitute an intolerable and undue
burden upon interstate and foreigu commerce ....
IdL at 1307.
115 318 F. Supp. at 928.
11 See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
H See, e.g., Aircraft lnv. Corp. v. Fisher Flying Serv., Inc., 183 So. 2d 441 (La. Cir. Ct.
App. 1966). There the court stated that
Congress by virtue of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution has
paramount power and control over air, and consequently has authority to enact
regulations and statutes covering aircraft including aircraft operated wholly within
a state.
Id. at 443. Cf. In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684, 689-90 (D.N.J. 1948).
"8 See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 879
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Veterans' Air Express Co., 76 F.
Supp. 684, 689 (D.N.J. 1948); People v. Western Airlines, lnc., 42 Cal. 2d 261, 268 P.2d 723
(1954).
19 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
120 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control.1
2 1
Similar reasoning led the district court in Burbank to decide that
the effect of the curfew ordinance on interstate commerce could
not be assessed independently of a national perspective. 22 The
court's concern that if the Burbank ordinance were sustained it
would encourage other communities to adopt similar measures
parallels the concerns expressed by the federal district courts which
invalidated the ordinances under review in the Cedarhurst123 and
Hempstead cases. 124
Since both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
disposed of the Burbank case under the supremacy clause 125 on the
ground of preemption, neither court addressed the question of
whether municipal regulation of the type attempted by the city of
Burbank would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
However, the four members of the Supreme Court who dissented
in Burbank were of the view that the district court's determination
of the commerce question, based upon a "predicted proliferation
of possibilities" was of doubtful validity. 126 The proper determina-
tion of an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, according
to the dissent, "turns on an evaluation of the facts of each case."'1 27
Since the Burbank ordinance did not affect emergency flights and
prohibited only one scheduled commercial flight each day and a
few additional private flights by corporate executives, the dissent-
ers thought that the ordinance could not be held to be an un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce. 128
III
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL
PROPRIETORS OF AIRPORTS
A. Proprietary Versus Governmental Noise Abatement Measures
The most troublesome aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Burbank is that although its language and rationale would
121 Id. at 37. See also United States v. Cummings, 184 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
122 318 F. Supp. at 927.
123 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
124 See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
125 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, d. 2.
126 411 U.S. at 654. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128 Id
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indicate that the federal government has preempted the entire field
of aircraft noise abatement, the factual context of the case is
limited to the situation wherein a municipality enacts noise abate-
ment measures affecting a privately owned and operated airport.
Such enactments were held to be void on the ground of federal
preemption. The Court did not consider what limits, if any, apply
to a municipality which functions as the proprietor of an airport.2 9
Its decision was concerned only with the municipality's exercise of
its police power.' 30 In light of the crucial fact that the Hollywood-
Burbank airport is probably the only airport in the country used by
federally certified air carriers that is not owned and operated by a
state or local government,131 the impact of the Court's opinion
appears to be rather limited.
In fact, the legislative histories of the 1968 Noise Abatement
Amendment 3 and the 1972 Noise Control Act,' 33 as interpreted
by the Court, indicates that these enactments would not affect the
rights of municipal airport proprietors to issue and enforce noise
abatement measures.' 34 The Port of New York Authority, for
example, a local public agency created by a New York-New Jersey
interstate compact which operates the airports in the New York
metropolitan area, was held to have the right to prohibit jet aircraft
from using a certain runway at La Guardia airport until the
construction of a second runway was completed. 35 This measure
was taken by the Authority to avoid the concentration ofjet aircraft
noise which would have resulted from the use of this runway alone.
The district court enforced the regulation by enjoining the airlines
from violating it.' 36
Similarly, the California appellate court in Stagg v. Municipal
Court, 13 7 upheld ajet curfew ordinance of the city of Santa Monica,
the owner and operator of the Santa Monica airport. Although the
129 Id. at 635-36 n.14; see notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
1:30 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.14.
131 Id. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see notes 139-43'and accompanying text
infra.
132 Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, § 1, 82 Stat. 395; see note 54 and
accompanying text supra.
M3 Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1239; see notes 58-61 and
accompanying text supra.
134 See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
135 Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y.
1966).
136 Id. at 754.
137 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969); see notes 96-99 and accompanying text
supra.
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court did not ground its decision on Santa Monica's proprietary
capacity, it did recognize the city's rights to regulate its municipally
owned airport as a public utility and its authority to regulate the
use of the airport under state enabling legislation. 138 The result
achieved by the Santa Monica ordinance parallels that attempted
by the enactment of the Burbank ordinance which was struck
down. The dissenting Justices in Burbank, critical of the court of
appeals' and the majority's adherence to the distinction between
municipalities acting in their proprietary capacity and those acting
in a regulatory capacity, believed that the legislative history relied
upon should not have been accorded controlling significance.' 39 "It
simply strains credulity," Justice Rehnquist concluded, "to believe
that the Secretary [of Transportation], the Senate Committee, or
Congress intended that all airports except the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport could enact curfews."' 40
138 2 Cal. App. 3d at 322-23, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 581. Under the California Government
Code, the operation of a municipally-owned airport is expressly committed to the local
agency. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50470 (West 1966). A municipality may acquire property for use
as an airport. Id. In addition, in connection with the erection or maintenance of airports or
facilities, a local agency may:
(f) Regulate the use of the airport and facilities and other property or means
of transportation within or over the airport.
(g) Perform any duties necessary or convenient for the regulation of air
traffic.
(h) Enter into contracts or otherwise cooperate with the Federal Govern-
ment or other public or private agencies.
(i) Exercise powers necessary or convenient in the promotion of aeronautics
and commerce and navigation by all.
Id. § 50474; see notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
139 411 U.S. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall
joined in this opinion.
140 Id. at 652. It was the view of the dissenters that neither the legislative history of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 nor that of the Noise Control Act of 1972 discloses any
congressional intent to prevent local governments from enacting regulations such as that of
the city of Burbank. They found that the legislative history of the 1972 Act evidenced
primary focus on the alteration of procedures within the Federal Government for
dealing with problems of aircraft noise already entrusted by Congress to federal
competence. The -1972 Act set up procedures by which the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency would have a role to play in the formulation and
review of standards promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration dealing
with noise emissions of jet aircraft. But because these agencies have exclusive
authority to reduce noise by promulgating regulations and implementing standards
directed at one or several of the causes of the level of noise, local governmental
bodies are not thereby foreclosed from dealing with the noise problem by every
other conceivable method.
Id.
The dissenting Justices believed that the legislative history also indicated an "affirmative
congressional intent to allow local regulation." Id. at 653. And even if it did not go that far,
they believed that the history certainly did not reflect "the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" to prohibit the exercise of "the historic police powers of the states" which would
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The dissent's objections appear to be well taken. The
majority's posture that the scheme of the Federal Aviation Act,
which "requires a delicate balance between safety and efficiency...
and the protection of persons on the ground,' 141 necessitates a
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation, 142 would cer-
tainly be undermined if municipal airport proprietors could freely
restrict the use of their facilities by imposing jet flight curfews or
other limitations. Indeed, the majority recognized that if a
significant number of municipalities adopted such curfew ordi-
nances, "fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and land-
ings would severely limit the flexibility of the F.A.A. in controlling
air traffic flow."' 43
Nevertheless, since the Court's focus lay on the municipality's
exercise of police power, the Burbank opinion leaves open the
question of whether the actions of a municipal airport proprietor
could be reached under the doctrine of preemption. 144 However,
the opinion of the federal district court in Port of New York Authority
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.1 45 seems to indicate that the FAA may
exercise its power to preempt an area of regulation in opposition to
a proprietor's regulations. 46 Crucial to the court's decision to
be required before a conclusion of implied preemption is reached. Id. Thus, they concluded
that
Congress could pre-empt the field to local regulation if it chose, and very likely the
authority conferred on the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration...
is sufficient to authorize him to promulgate regulations effectively pre-empting
local action. But neither Congress nor the Administrator has chosen to go that
route. Until one of them does, the ordinance of the city of Burbank is a valid
exercise of its police power.
Id.
141 411 U.S. at 638-39.
142 Id. at 639.
143 Id.
144 See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
145 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
146 Id. at 752. The Port Authority, for the purpose of noise abatement, had established
a preferential system of landings and takeoffs on certain runways at La Guardia Airport,
thereby restricting use of those runways. It was the view of the Eastern Regional Director of
the FAA that the regulations would, under certain weather conditions, "complicate and
place an unnecessary burden on-air traffic control and derogate from the efficient move-
ment of air commerce." Id. However, a letter to the Port Authority from the Federal
Aviation Administrator stated that "in making the runway available for the fullest use
required by safety considerations we are not directing that the runway be used." Id. at 753.
In fact, the Administrator stated no objection to the continuation of the agreement between
the Authority and the airlines to restrict use of the runway. Id.
Based upon these statements, the court concluded that although the FAA believed that
the runways in question could be safely used, it was not then prepared to direct their use in
the interest of safety or to preempt the regulation of their use in contradiction to the Port
Authority's rules and regulations. It may thus be inferred that the court thought it possible
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sustain the Port Authority's regulation was the fact that the FAA
neither objected to the regulation nor intervened in the proceeding
brought to enforce it against the airlines.147 It would seem that
under the supremacy clause, an airport operator should be barred
from imposing a restriction on flight operations which "stands as
an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. '"148
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, although rec-
ognizing the authority left to airport proprietors in the area of
noise regulation, seems to accept this position.' 49 In an advisory
opinion holding that it would not be constitutionally competent for
the state to enact legislation prohibiting the landing of any com-
mercial supersonic aircraft within the state of Massachusetts, it
remarked that "[e]ven if the bill were framed in terms of 'airport
proprietors' there would still be serious doubt about its constitu-
tional validity."'150
In contrast, it is clear that the status of a local government as
proprietor would not insulate it from the exercise of federal
control to the extent that Congress exercised such control pursuant
to its powers under the commerce clause. In the absence of
for the FAA to prevent the Port Authority from regulating the use of its runways. The court
stated its view as follows:
It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the F.A.A. possesses the power and
authority to pre-empt the area of regulating the use of the runways for purposes of
air traffic control into and out of LaGuardia Airport. The issue here is whether the
F.A.A. has actually attempted to exercise such power and authority in opposition to
the Port Authority's regulations and has thus frozen the area.
Id. at 752. See also United States v. New Haven, 447 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1971).
147 259 F. Supp. at 753.
148 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Since Hines, the Supreme Court has
frequently adhered to this articulation of the meaning of the supremacy clause. Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971). See also Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,
240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
149 Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 778, 271 N.E.2d 354, 358-59 (1971). The
Massachusetts court acknowledged that the "legislative history of the 1968 amendment
contains .. . some indication that Congress did not intend completely to exclude all State
action in the field of aircraft noise control," and agreed that "the F.A.A. bas acted
consistently with the legislative history in leaving some authority to airport proprietors in the
regulation of noise." Id. at 357.
5I Id. at 358. In making this statement the court referred to an FAA notice of
proposed noise control with respect to supersonic aircraft and indicated its belief that
"[flederal action in this area may well invalidate any State action in the area." Id. Further-
more, the court indicated that if state regulation of noise had an effect on the operation of
aircraft in the state, "there would remain the question whether the bill imposes an
unreasonable or discriminatory burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 358-59.
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congressional action, the commerce clause seems to protect the free
flow of interstate commerce from the hostile actions of state or
local governments even when they take such actions in their
proprietary capacity. It has been held by the Supreme Court, in
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, ''
that "freedom from interference on the part of the States is not
confined to a simple prohibition of laws impairing [interstate
commerce], but extends to interference by any ultimate organ."'152
In that case, it was not action by a state legislature, but action by a
state court, which was found to interfere with interstate commerce.
The Court found that a state court order to remove a bridge which
was a necessary part of interstate commerce constituted an inter-
ference with such commerce and with a matter under the exclusive
control of Congress. 53 Since state court orders, as well as local
legislation, are subject to scrutiny under the commerce clause,
there does not appear to be any barrier to a similar analysis of state
or local action taken in a proprietary capacity. Indeed, the Port
Authority opinion suggests that the actions of a municipal airport
proprietor could in fact be subject to considerations under the
commerce clause as well as under the supremacy clause.' 54
B. Liability of the Municipal Airport Proprietor: Griggs v. Allegheny
County Revisited
The reservation of some authority for airport proprietors in
the regulation of noise indicated in the legislative history of federal
noise control legislation is required for consistency with the re-
sponsibilities placed upon the airport proprietor by the United
States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County. 155 In that case
the Court held that an airport operator is financially responsible to
nearby property owners for property damage resulting from air-
craft noise where commercial flights over the property are so low
that the result of such activity is a "taking"-within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment-of an "air easement" over the
property. 56 The Court viewed this responsibility of the local au-
233 U.S. 75 (1914).
Id. at 78.
'3 Id. at 79. See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 125 U.S. 530
(1888) (holding that under statute authorizing telegraph companies to maintain lines on
United States post roads, state could not stop operation of lines by injunction for failure to
pay taxes).
2 59 F. Supp. at 752; see note 146 and accompanying text supra.
'5 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
'5 Id. at 89; see Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
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thority as part of its responsibility to acquire by eminent domain
sufficient land for the operation of the airport. 57 The Court
observed that there was no difference between the responsibility of
the local authority "for the air easements necessary for operation
of the airport and its responsibility for the land on which the
runways were built.' 58 According -to this reasoning, the federal
government "takes nothing," since it is the local authority which
decides to build the airport and determines where it will be
located.' 59 The effect of the Griggs ruling is to direct complaining
landowners to sue the local airport operator for a "taking" under
the fourteenth amendment or comparable state constitutional pro-
visions.
To maintain a position consistent with Griggs, the FAA has
acted to avoid responsibility for the taking of such noise easements.
In issuing regulations pursuant to section 611 of the Federal
Aviation Act,' 60 the FAA stated:
The noise limits specified . . . are not intended to substitute
federally determined noise levels for those more restrictive limits
determined to be necessary by individual airport proprietors in
response to the locally determined desire for quiet and the
locally determined need for the benefits of air commerce. 161
The regulations themselves indicate that no determination has
been made that the specified noise levels need be "acceptable" in
particular airport environments. 2
The Federal Aviation Administrator in a decision in In re
Jordan A. Dreifus163 has also evidenced the FAA's deference to the
responsibilities of the local airport proprietor. In that case, the
petitioner's residence was becoming exposed to increasing turbojet
traffic and resulting noise. To remedy the situation, he requested
generally that the FAA issue noise regulations to relieve the noise
burden on the neighbors of the Santa Monica Airport and
specifically that the FAA restrict the hours of operation of turbojet
aircraft at the airport, 6 4 as had been previously attempted by the
'7 369 U.S. at 89-90; see note 156 supra.
158 369 U.S. at 89.
159 Id.
160 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
161 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355 (1969) (preface to 1968 noise abatement amendment); see 14
C.F.R. §§ 36.1-.201 (1974).
162 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1973).
16 No. 9071 (FAA, July 10, 1969), reprinted in Brief for Appellants at Appendix 4,
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
164 Brief for Appellants, supra note 163, at Appendix 6.
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city of Santa Monica in an ordinance held invalid by a lower state
court. 165 In response, the Administrator declined to issue noise
abatement rules beyond those already implemented, stating that
"further relief from aircraft noise should involve airport use re-
strictions similar to those that... were issued in the Santa Monica
City ordinance.' 166 Although the Administrator acknowledged that
the Federal Aviation Act provided his agency with broad powers in
the field of aircraft noise abatement, he took the position that
section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act had not obliterated the
authority of local government proprietors of airports. 6 7 To sup-
port this position the Administrator quoted with approval the
Senate report concerning the addition of section 611:
[T]he Federal Government is in no position to require an airport
to accept service by noisier aircraft, and for that purpose to
obtain additional noise easements. The issue is the service de-
sired by the airport owner and the steps it is willing to take to
obtain the service. In dealing with this issue, the Federal Gov-
ernment should not substitute its judgment for that of the States
or elements of local government who, for the most part, own and
operate our Nation's airports.168
The underlying policy for this position is the view that com-
munities should bear a heavy share of the responsibility for assur-
ing the compatibility of the air service they desire with their
environmental objectives.' 69 If this policy is given effect, the
rationale of Griggs, establishing local liability for the consequences
of aircraft noise pollution, may be appropriately implemented, for
then such liability would accompany responsibility for dealing with
aircraft noise.
The dissenters in Griggs, however, took issue with the
majority's determination that the airport operators should be re-
sponsible for taking the air easement. They took the view that the
taking was done by the United States, for the airport was designed
subject to federal -approval and in compliance with federal re-
quirements. Congress, they observed, had enacted a comprehen-
sive scheme "regulating in minute detail virtually every aspect of
air transit.' 70 Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Black em-
165 See notes 25-28 andl-accompanying text supra.
166 Brief for Appellants, supra note 163, at Appendix 7.
167 Id. at Appendix 9.
168 Id.
1 69 Id. at 10.
170 369 U.S. at 91 (Black, J., dissenting).
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phasized that the Federal Aviation Act guaranteed a "public right
of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable
airspace" and that the term "navigable airspace" included that
"airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of
aircraft." '' Thus, he concluded that
where Congress has already declared airspace free to all . . it
need not again be acquired by an airport .... Having taken the
airspace over Griggs' private property for a public use, it is the
United States which owes just compensation.' 72
In fact, some commentators, believing the outcome of Griggs to be
erroneous, have claimed that the dissenters' position that the
federal government should be liable for the taking of noise ease-
ments would have enabled more meaningful relief to those resid-
ing in the vicinity of airports.1 7 3
In any event, since the federal government, under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Burbank, has apparently preempted the
field of aircraft noise control, the Court's decision in Griggs must be
reconsidered. A necessary corollary to the Griggs decision is that
airport proprietors, including state and local governmental agen-
cies, must remain outside the scope of federal control. When
narrowly viewed, the holding in Burbank does not require the
overruling of Griggs, for the Court expressly declined to assert that
municipal airport proprietors were preempted from taking mea-
sures to abate aircraft noise at the airports.17 4 But the Court did
not say that there were no limits upon municipalities acting in their
proprietary capacity. Indeed, it would be frivolous to assume, in
light of the Burbank rationale, that jet curfews, for example, could
be enacted by numerous municipalities in their capacity as airport
proprietors. Even when acting as proprietors, municipalities are
still organs of the state, and their actions may be subject to review
now that the Court has espoused the doctrine of federal preemp-
171 Id. at 92 (quoting Federal Aviation Act, currently codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(24),
1304 (1970)).
17 Id. at 93-94.
173 Thus, it has been said that
[t]he inescapable fact is that the Griggs ruling placed the financial burden of aircraft
noise on the segment of the aviation community that could do least about it ...
Because Griggs failed to place the financial burden of aircraft noise on either the
airlines or the Federal Government, neither had any direct economic inducement to
assign to noise suppression the high priority it required in aircraft development-a
rank co-equal to that of safety.
Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Powcr But Local Liability, 3 URBAN LAW. 175, 202
(1971). See also Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective, Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63.
174 See notes 68-71 & 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
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tion in the field of aircraft noise regulation. Certainly the perva-
siveness of the scheme of regulation and the need for national
uniformity emphasized by the Court in Burbank should be the
determinative factors in reviewing the actions of a municipality,
whether it exercises police powers or proprietary powers.17 5
If the rationale of Burbank were thus given its full meaning,
the continued vitality of Griggs would be doubtful. The FAA would
be able to exercise exclusive control over aircraft noise while the
federal government and the airlines would remain shielded from
liability. 17 6 On the other hand, municipalities, whether acting in a
proprietary capacity or exercising their police powers, would be
powerless to take measures to abate aircraft noise, while remaining
liable to nearby property owners for damages resulting from the
noise of flights passing over their property. 77
CONCLUSION
It is evident that a single regulatory scheme under federal
auspices is the most desirable method of controlling aircraft noise.
The national interest in the free flow of air commerce transcends
the local interests of communities neighboring airports. The Su-
preme Court did, in fact, take this position in City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Terminal, Inc.178 Nevertheless, the Court accepted the
distinction between municipalities acting as airport proprietors and
those acting in a regulatory capacity, declaring that federal legisla-
tion preempted only the actions of the latter. Although the Burbank
decision clarified an area of the law to the extent that it announced
federal preemption of the field of aircraft noise, and although its
rationale might be extended to reach the actions of municipal
proprietors, its limited holding appears to leave unchanged the
situation described by one legal writer several years ago:
The F.A.A. has attempted to play both ends against the
middle-with the private citizens winding up in the middle. It
piously states that no complete answer can come from the federal
17 Indeed, the sweeping language of the Burbank majority would appear to support
this position. See notes 42-45, 63, 77 & I1l-15 and accompanying text supra.
176 If the Griggs doctrine did in fact give way to one of federal liability under the fifth
amendment, that liability might be more limited than that of public airport authorities,
especially in states whose constitutions provide for compensation for damaging as well as
taking. See Note, Federal Regulation of Air Transportation and the Environmental Impact Problem,
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 336, 337 n.99 (1968).
177 Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 591, 394 P.2d
548, 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714 (1964).
118 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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government and that local regulation is both necessary and
desirable. At the same time, it accepts with open arms the court
determinations that any action to relieve the noise nuisance of
aircraft must come from the federal government. 179
Under these circumstances, it is clear that a more effective
federal program of noise abatement is needed. The environmental
needs of local communities have not yet been satisfied. Until
technology produces quiet jetcraft, the FAA must be spurred to a
more active role in the field it has apparently preempted. Perhaps
an outright reversal of Griggs, placing liability for aircraft noise
pollution on the federal government, would prompt more effective
action. A counterbalance for the FAA itself, which could probably
be implemented without great difficulty, would provide for a local
voice in determining noise abatement procedures at airports. In
this manner a regulatory system could be established which would
be uniform, but which at the same time would remain responsive
to the environmental needs of particular localities.
Marcia L. Goldstein
1 9 Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 631, 724 (1970).
